AL ISLAM KEMUHAMMADIYAHAN
Small Wars Journal The Erosion of
Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Carl J. Ciovacco Since its inception, al
Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to
complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing
entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to
specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved
through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These
phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase
Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass
destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the
harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause
. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps. The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In its evolving mission from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to apostate Muslim regimes in the 1990s, to its current fight against the West, it has employed a variety of tactics in its conduct of war. Against the Soviets and Muslim regimes of Middle East, Northern Africa, and South East Asia, al Qaeda limited its use of force to combatants and government officials. However, in its current fight against the West, and more specifically America, it has shifted its tactics to the targeted killing of noncombatants. What has caused this great shift and departure from past deference to noncombatant immunity? In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, for the purposes of better understanding this phenomenon, al Qaeda has published much of its reasoning behind its actions. Perhaps more than any other warring party in history, al Qaeda has shared its strategy, tactics, views, and even vulnerabilities for the entire world to see in the global media. 1 It is through these rare glimpses into the psyche of al Qaeda that we can better understand why this shift happened. By placing this shift into five finite phases, we can learn more about the driving factors for the erosion of noncombatant immunity within al Qaeda. Background Before diving into the analysis of the five-phase transition of al Qaeda with respect to noncombatant immunity, it would be prudent to briefly explore two background areas: the leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Islamic Just War ethic. These areas are critical to understanding how bin Laden sees the world and what constraints he operates under when using the cover of Islam for his legitimacy. The contextual importance of understanding the many facets of Islam with respect to war, jihad, and noncombatants cannot be overstated
. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps. The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In its evolving mission from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to apostate Muslim regimes in the 1990s, to its current fight against the West, it has employed a variety of tactics in its conduct of war. Against the Soviets and Muslim regimes of Middle East, Northern Africa, and South East Asia, al Qaeda limited its use of force to combatants and government officials. However, in its current fight against the West, and more specifically America, it has shifted its tactics to the targeted killing of noncombatants. What has caused this great shift and departure from past deference to noncombatant immunity? In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. Fortunately, for the purposes of better understanding this phenomenon, al Qaeda has published much of its reasoning behind its actions. Perhaps more than any other warring party in history, al Qaeda has shared its strategy, tactics, views, and even vulnerabilities for the entire world to see in the global media. 1 It is through these rare glimpses into the psyche of al Qaeda that we can better understand why this shift happened. By placing this shift into five finite phases, we can learn more about the driving factors for the erosion of noncombatant immunity within al Qaeda. Background Before diving into the analysis of the five-phase transition of al Qaeda with respect to noncombatant immunity, it would be prudent to briefly explore two background areas: the leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Islamic Just War ethic. These areas are critical to understanding how bin Laden sees the world and what constraints he operates under when using the cover of Islam for his legitimacy. The contextual importance of understanding the many facets of Islam with respect to war, jihad, and noncombatants cannot be overstated
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